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"Trends of American Foreign Policy"

Wayne Lyman Morse

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[about 40 seconds of applause]

CHAIRMAN: It sounds like there are a lot of you out there. I wish I might be able to see that, but very good. Welcome to the second, I guess, plenary session regarding the student symposium on foreign affairs. [mic feedback] Yes, I'm up here someplace. I wonder if we're going to need an introduction for our speaker for the day. It sounds like you recognized him as we came onto the stage. But in all fairness to the man who has been delegated to introduce him, at least let me present the student intermediary.

Brad Skinner is responsible. Let's leave it there. He is the chairman of the coordinating committee that brought this symposium into being at Portland State University. He's worked night and day for the last two years, virtually; it's probably seemed that way to him, getting all the arrangements and everything accounted for. Making sure that things come off the way we hope they will. Brad is a junior—which I think says quite a bit for his abilities—a junior in political science and urban affairs, which to my way of thinking is on the other end of the continuum of two of the greatest problems facing students today: external and foreign affairs that we're discussing in this symposium, and internal within the cities in America. Brad has the very auspicious responsibility at this time of presenting to you our major speaker, so Brad, if you would, please.

[applause]

BRAD SKINNER: In the 1790s, the Marquis de Sade once said, “Talk is cheap; the price of action, colossal.” [laughter] But every so often, there comes a voice who cries out, “Whoa, hold on,” and asks why. I give to you a man who talks and acts, a man who looks not to the past but to the future with perspective and insight, but most of all, with principle: Senator Wayne Morse.

[applause]

SENATOR WAYNE MORSE: Mr. Chairman, Brad, and friends. I am delighted to be with you on this occasion to present to you a brief paper on the subject matter that your program committee asked me to talk to you about. Following which, I shall do the best I can to take questions. Before necessarily covering as broad a field as “trends in American foreign policy,” the paper is characterized somewhat by generalizations, although I will probably digress from it briefly now and then—but not too much, because I want to save as much time for the question period as possible—and I’m keeping my eyes on the watch.

In the closing months of the 90th Congress, there was building up in the United States Senate a clear-cut Constitutional issue over the formulation and control of American foreign policy. Entwined with the Constitutional part of this issue is the political ramifications of it, which saw a president elected only three and a half years earlier with one of the largest margins in history compelled to withdraw from further candidacy. The situation in which the Johnson administration found itself in March 1968 was exactly the situation the framers of the Constitution had planned to avoid when they gave the war power to Congress rather than to the president. Under Constitutional design, war is embarked upon only through joint resolution passed by both houses and signed into law by the president. It is a legislative process, not an administrative one. Its purpose and scope are plainly stated. The war policy thus becomes the law of the land—the national policy—as fully and completely as we can establish national policy.

Now I digress only momentarily to tell you that you need to keep your ears and eyes open to the propaganda that was afoot during the Johnson administration and is afoot again, trying to rationalize the point of view that Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution has become outmoded; or as Mr. Katzenbach, the former Attorney General of the United States and the Undersecretary of State during the latter years of Johnson’s administration, went on to say: that not only this section but other sections of the Constitution are outmoded too. And expects you to accept it. And if you accept it, then you have only yourselves to blame for the eroding away of Constitutional guarantees. Because don’t forget: those Constitutional fathers wrote into that Constitution a check upon the exercise of government by man rather than by law. And that’s what Katzenbach spelled out, was a proposal for government by man rather than by law. The Constitutional fathers wrote the amending procedures into the Constitution.

As you know, I have argued on this matter of the trend toward government by executive supremacy in this republic during the entire 24 years that I served in the Congress. It is getting through at long last. One of the greatest contributions on this issue is that of Bill Fulbright's. In the last session of Congress—and I was proud to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with him as one of the co-sponsors of it—he proposed a resolution—and he has announced that it is going to be reintroduced probably in a modified but even stronger form—for a survey of this whole issue of the delegating away by Congress of the United States of congressional checks on executive power.

And this is what has happened in regard to this matter of war-making activities without declaration of war. A repetition, time and time again; you read it only in the past few days again in the paper. Presidents have time and time again sent troops abroad to die in the self-defense of the republic. The president does have self-defense powers, but he doesn't have the power to make war under the guise of self-defense. He has to respond to the particular incident that creates the need for his exercising self-defense authority. And so, may I say to the faculty present that I tried to apply a learning technique that you find it necessary to apply from time to time: the learning technique of repetition. So, 2 to 5 times a week, for several years after the outbreak of the war in Vietnam, I discussed some of these abstract principles of Constitutional government on the floor of the Senate. I raised my voice in protest of the exercise of government by men by the president of the United States, instead of government by law. After Katzenbach's great contribution to Constitutional law, I took to the floor of the Senate and said if he were in my Constitutional law class, I'd flunk him. [laughter]

[applause]

Three times I read the great war message of Woodrow Wilson of April 1917 to the Senate. Which, early in the message, as you will see when you draw it out of the library, as I hope you will if I can encourage that amount of interest in what I am talking about this afternoon. He said, and I paraphrase him, but very accurately: "I am without Constitutional authority to make war, in the absence of a Congressional declaration of war." And then I read twice to the Senate, in full, President Roosevelt's great war message following Pearl Harbor. There, he had the self-defense principle applied. He had the clear duty to respond immediately to the dastardly attack of the Japanese on our fleet in Pearl Harbor. But he also not only went through a response in self-defense, but he went to his desk, and he proceeded to write his war message. For he recognized that the situation went far beyond the matter of self-defense, to meet an emergency crisis. We were confronted with the security of the republic that was bound to lead us into a war with Japan, and he saw recommended in the war message.

And I'd have you keep that in mind, because if you continue to read in editorial after editorial that after all, this whole matter of following Constitutional guarantees has somehow, in some way become passé. Whenever a president or his advisers and their discretion decide that they

have some right to ignore these abstract principles of Constitutionalism, you can't continue to do it without ending up in sometime in the future—and it need not be too long—what amounts in effect, in this republic, to government by men. With the Congress, time and time again, in times of great crisis, simply rubberstamping the fear arguments, the emotional appeals of presidents to authorize them to go ahead and make war, without facing up to the people's right to have a discussion of a declaration of war. You can't explain, may I say, either the Formosa resolution, which I touch upon later in my manuscript, or the Tonkin Bay resolution without facing up to the fact that here was an attempt to get the Congress of the United States unconstitutionally to proceed to authorize the sending of American boys into a war-making situation without following the constitutional procedure.

I wanted to give you that digression now because, disagree as you may, and of course, I come before you not asking for agreement, I just couldn't care less… [laughter and applause] It's not agreement that's important these days, but it is important that we try to be students of government if we're going to resolve our problems in keeping with our obligations as citizen-statesmen to follow a course of action based on government by law, instead of the exercise of arbitrary and capricious power and discretion by mere men that happened to hold for the time being a position of elected authority. That's why I pleaded with President Johnson so many times for him to recognize the importance of these procedures to be followed, rather than to continue to follow the course of action that caused him on March 31 to announce that he would not be a candidate for the Democratic nomination. And I think that history will record that the reason that he had to come to that decision was because of the great mistakes he had exercised by way of arbitrary discretion *vis-à-vis* the war in Vietnam.

A war waged by administrative decision leaves every aspect of that war an arguable matter. Its purpose, its scope, as well as its day-to-day prosecution, are left to individual discretion. All are subject to second-guessing and public dispute. The bombing of North Vietnam has been a good example of the inadequacy of administrative war. When we began bombing North Vietnam in February 1965, we attacked a country that had not attacked the United States territory, and which had no apparent intention of doing so. The first explanation for the bombing was that it was in retaliation for the Viet Cong assault upon the barracks of U.S. troops at Pleiku in the central highlands of South Vietnam 12 hours earlier. Remember the emotional appeal President Johnson made on that incident to American public opinion over TV. Its purpose was explained at that time as one of showing the Viet Cong, and their friends in North Vietnam, that we could levy far greater destruction upon them then they could upon us.

Within a few months, however, the Secretary of Defense began to justify the continuation of the bombings as necessary for cutting the supply lines from the north into the south. Lengthy descriptions were made available to the press of infiltration routes, of bridges destroyed, of key passes closed by massive explosions delivered by our B-52s. But the trickle of infiltration that was going on when the bombing started grew to large proportions. There were explanations

that without the bombing, infiltration would've been even heavier and not as costly to Hanoi. Yet the level of manpower and equipment that went south seems to have been determined, essentially, by North Vietnam and not by American airpower. It was not until the bombing policy had been in operation for a matter of years that it was then said to have been undertaken to bolster the morale of the South Vietnamese government, which was at a low ebb in the early months of 1965. What the real reason for the bombing may have been cannot yet be known by the American people. It is not really known by Congress that the carrying of armed attack into the territory and population of another country, and at levels of intensity unsurpassed even in World War II, was not undertaken as a matter of a unified international policy to conduct war against North Vietnam. It was undertaken, stopped, and started up again for reasons that only a few administrators knew then and even now.

And may I digress just momentarily again, to point out that you cannot understand this bombing policy. You cannot understand this war-making policy of an escalated war by President Johnson unless you understand that the primary purpose for our being in Southeast Asia—and it has been true from the very beginning—is to maintain an American military foothold on the land mass of Asia for the purpose of supposedly being in a position to militarily contain China. And if I say nothing in this lecture that I'd have you remember, as far as my point of view is concerned, I would have you remember this: you cannot maintain an American foothold on the mainland of Asia. You cannot militarily contain China without eventually going to war with China, and that probably will be at the date of her selection more than ours. Although it may very well be that the escalators can get us into it on some date of their selection. But fundamentally, that's the issue of American foreign policy *vis-à-vis* Asia. And we've got to recognize before it is too late, as all other Western powers have already recognized, that no Western power will ever be allowed to maintain a military foothold anywhere in Asia. And of course, they *shouldn't* be allowed to maintain a foothold in Asia. [applause]

You will never understand my opposition to military policy in Asia unless you understand that in my judgment, now, in this era of civilization, we do not have the slightest right to maintain a unilateral military foothold outside of our direct lines of defense, and that doesn't include Asia, anywhere in the world. And that's why we've got to stop, and it's only going to be stopped by the American people. That's why we've got to stop seeking to build an American military lifeline around the world to supplant the crumbled and crushed British lifeline. For we'll be no more successful in military imperialism than Great Britain was with her military imperialism. [applause]

These reasons for bombing, and the various bombing causes, were typical of our entire adventure in Southeast Asia. They're not a war policy. They are a use of military force to buttress and enforce a diplomatic policy that cannot succeed on its own. And that's the second major premise I want to lay down in this lecture. No matter what the semantics are, the facts are we're using this military might to carry out a diplomatic policy, and it's the diplomatic policy

that's got to be changed if you're going to change the military policy. With a wealth of money, manpower, and weapons that no doubt seems limitless to policymakers, we've seen the United States come readily and easily to practice the old dictum that war is but the pursuit of diplomacy by different means. The system is often advertised and described now as something new, a necessity in a different kind of world that Americans knew in the good old days, when military force was used only to defend American territory, and then upon a declaration of war. But there is really nothing new about it at all.

For nearly three centuries, Great Britain practiced the same tactic, using military power from one end of the world to another to gain this political end, and to enforce that diplomacy they could not succeed on its own. Thus was an empire created. And then it was said being the world's leading power, the burdens of leadership and responsibility called for even more massive involvements in the Crimea, in South Africa, in France. Britain saw great value in sending her military forces abroad, using them to enforce her diplomatic foreign policies. Part of the theory held that it was better to fight abroad on someone else's territory than to let warfare come to the British Isles. But the policy brought the expenditure of such blood and wealth in World War I, that the collapse of the empire was but a matter of years. And the technology war brought destruction to British territory in World War II, even without the landing of hostile forces.

Far from being a new concept, the amalgamation of armed forces with the diplomacy is as old as the nation-state. Its merger under the executive is as old as the kings. Indeed, in explaining the assignment of the war power to Congress rather than to the president, the Federalist papers mention that in this respect, our constitution is quite different than the British constitution, denying to the American president a power held and exercised by British kings. In fact, some of the historical writers have pointed out that one of the reasons, only one, but one of the reasons for the revolution, was to revolt against the discretion of British kings to send British subjects to the battlefields to be slaughtered without the voice of the people really having any control.

Most countries are saved from the easy use of the military force abroad by a scarcity of means. The country that cannot afford to enforce its foreign political objectives by use of military power does not find it necessary to do so. The country that can afford to send and maintain armies and navies around the world, seems to find reasons why we must do so. That's why, in my judgment, if you got any settlement out of Paris—and don't count on it—but if you got any settlement out of Paris, that wouldn't stop American military involvement around the world. They'd just move, in my judgment, to another situs.

Fear of change is usually the reason that is found. Fear of a vacuum of power. Fear that where America does not dominate, someone else will. Fear that if we do not enforce our stated will in one part of the world, it will be ignored everywhere. The cost of our policy is considerable.

National defense costs run over than 30 billion dollars a year. Weaponry is the largest single activity of our national government. Our defense budget is over 80 billion dollars for this fiscal. In the case of Vietnam, since 1954, when we first began aiding South Vietnam in an effort to create a country where none existed, we have spent a grand total of 90 billion dollars. First on economic aid, then on military aid, as well as finally to sustain the fourth biggest war in American history. Judging from casualties, it is now the third largest war in American history. The availability of so much power has, in my opinion, sadly corrupted the administrative judgement of what is sound policy for the United States to pursue. Perhaps Vietnam is a good example of the difficulty that the military establishment has in trying to make an unsound policy work through the application of force.

Half a million men and the dropping of more explosives than were used in Western Europe throughout World War II, have not compelled North Vietnam, in the words of Secretary of State Rusk, to stop doing what she's doing, which has been to aid guerrillas in the South. And this a remarkable drama in Southeast Asia. Here are people of a little area of a country, North Vietnam, without a navy, without any air force of any consequence, without really any heavy firepower, with practically nothing but the manpower they are willing to sacrifice, have been able to hold out during these many many years of war in that part of the world, first against the French and now against the United States. And that's why, when we had Ambassador Bunker the last time he appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee when I was in the Senate, tell us—and we used to get this kind of report from others—well, the prospects of its being over are very good. [laughter]

Before I left Saigon, I was briefed by our military leaders, and they pointed out that the prisoners they had captured were down now to 12, 13, 14-year-old boys in full military regalia fighting against United States forces, with its great superiority and manpower and firepower in the materiel of war. That can't last very much longer, he said. I said, Mr. Ambassador, did it ever dawn on you that maybe it tells us something else? That their spirit of nationalism is such, their determination to prevent us from imposing our military will upon them is such, that they are willing to sacrifice down to their last child? Have you ever thought of the moral issue that is involved in their demonstration? And then he talked about atrocities. Well, that shut me up. [laughter] And I said, are you ready to defend what eventually, I think, will cause the United States to be brought before juridical councils, even though we win—of course, we better win, in the sense the military talks about it. Because if we don't, the German war crime hearings will not be the last. When we think of the violation… [applause]

When we think of the violations of the articles of war that the United States has been guilty of in Southeast Asia, rationalizing and alibi-ing on the grounds that the North Vietnamese are also guilty of great violations of moral principles that are inherent in articles of war. For example, our turning of North Vietnamese prisoners over to the South Vietnmaese, knowing full well the type of atrocities those prisoners would be subjected to; but you don't hear much about that!

You do not hear about the atrocities that we commit, and our scorched-earth policy that we have followed. Shocking that a great nation, even for military experimental purposes, would use a war in Southeast Asia to carry on those experiments. The interesting thing is that much of the world knows about it. You know what we used to do on the Foreign Relations Committee? To find out what was happening in Southeast Asia, we paid very little attention to the reports out of the Pentagon building and the State Department. We had members of the staff whose principal job was to get us a summary of the clippings that he was able to gather from the foreign press and from the exchange of diplomatic notes between foreign diplomacy, foreign embassies, and Southeast Asia and other embassies of the world. And the world knows the inhumaneness of the conduct of this war by the United States in Southeast Asia, and generations of Americans are going to have to live with that blotted history on the records of history. Because we're not going to be able to explain it away on the grounds of, well, everything goes in war.

We can not be a party to practicing that very fallacious and vicious doctrine, and we have been practicing it in North Vietnam. And the criticism should not be upon our troops. The criticism should be upon the military and upon the White House and upon the State Department, for ever putting up with the kind of orders that have gone out and the conduct of the military activities themselves in Southeast Asia. When, in addition to the warping of judgement, is the loss of support at home that such use of military power entails. More and more people are beginning to recognize that our hands are not lily-white in Southeast Asia. I think Vietnam is rightly called the most unpopular war in American history, ranking alongside of Korea in that unpopularity. Both were undeclared foreign wars; both were fought for what the administrators called limited purposes; both are described as not lending themselves to declarations of war, because our purposes in fighting did not include the destruction or occupation of either North Korea or North Vietnam. Rather, they're described as designed to force another country to stop doing something we want stopped.

It is not usually mentioned, but both of these most unpopular wars not only were undeclared by the United States, but they were raised against countries that did not attack the United States and showed no sign of doing so. They were interventions on behalf of another country. It is, I think, the fact that the war is fought to defend someone else that American public opinion has had such a hard time following it. When the object of our protection changes as often as the governments in Saigon have changed… [laughter]...when corruption and profiteering are among their foremost qualities, it is not easy for the American people to believe for long that they deserve the American blood and money that go into their support. And that's why, when I was your Senator, I never cast a single vote for this war, and I never voted a dollar of appropriations for it.

[applause]

Of course, my patriotism was challenged by editorial writers in the country. [laughter] And of course, a *Blitzkrieg* against me by the press of my state; but I never will forget the last supplemental appropriation we had for South Vietnam. Thirteen and a half billion dollars; and I announced early in the day, without a lengthy speech at all in support of it, because I knew that would come later, that I was going to vote against the appropriation. I knew that would produce some speeches that needed to be put on the record, and it sure did. Some of my liberal friends—a remarkable breed… [laughter and applause] …some of my liberal friends who were finding it so difficult to live with their consciences on the basis of their voting record, none too subtly suggested that I was letting down the boys in Vietnam. And so I took to the floor of the Senate, when I got them all out on a limb and I thought it was time to apply the saw. [laughter] And I said, "I want to answer these implications that aren't too subtle. I want to tell you who is letting down those boys in Vietnam: those of you sitting in front of me"—and you'll find this in the record, I am paraphrasing—"on the other side of those two swinging doors," and I was pointing to the doors leading out to the Senate cloak room, "tell me and have told me now for three years how right I've been in my opposition to the war. And then you come on the floor of the Senate and vote to support the war, quite contrary to the verbal votes you cast out in the cloakroom. And they are going to vote to let down those boys in South Vietnam by voting 13 and a half billion dollars to kill more of them in an ever-escalating war. When each one of you knows, that when you cast this vote today, you're walking out on a Constitutional check that the Constitutional fathers gave you as the Senate to check the policy of a president of the United States in foreign policy with which you disagree. We call it the check of the purse strings. For you know that the pipelines are full, and when I vote against this appropriation today, I will not deny a single boy in Vietnam a single pair of boots, a single bullet, a single rifle, a single piece of war materiel, for six to nine months. But you vote against it to give the President notice that he isn't going to get any more money to carry on a war which you tell me out in the cloak room you disagree with. That's my answer to your charge in regard to letting down the boys in Vietnam. But I'll tell you what I'm not letting down; I'm not letting down the trust that I undertook when I took that oath up at the vice president's chair, the last time I was sworn in, as each one of you did, to uphold the Constitutional checks. Now, if you're against this war, then serve notice on the president that he's going to have to change his policy, because you are not going to give him any more money to continue a wrong war."

Well, read the record for a reply. You'd have to have a record of what happened in the cloak room afterwards. [laughter] Because what my friends said—and I will not use their colorful adjectives that were given, may I say, out of love and affection, rather than by way of attack—but they were very profane in some of their comments. But they all added up: "You *would* do that to us." [laughter]

But you know what they're afraid of? You, and I refer to "you" in the generic sense, for at that time they thought it was popular to support the war, and they had convinced themselves that it was more important they be re-elected than that they follow where the facts lead. And I think

that is probably the fourth thing that I want to leave with you in this lecture. I don't have it in the manuscript, but I'll put it in right now. [laughter] Just stop paying attention to any politician, including your speaker this afternoon, unless what he says squares with his voting record. That's the test of a politician serving you. [applause]

And the fact is, you've got to do a better job than you've been doing in checking that voting record. It was the expectation of the framers of the Constitution that by placing the war powers in Congress, these disadvantages would not occur. For the Congress to commit the military forces would, so the constitution assumes, would require a widespread general realization that the basic safety and interest of the nation were at stake. The object and purpose of the war would be exposed to Congressional debate and therefore, to public discussion. Enactment of a resolution of war would give expression to a national unity of purpose. Despite the objections raised to a declaration of war in the current Vietnam conflict, it would set forth a limited purpose and objective that still would establish a unified national policy. Remember that even the administration that embarks upon the use of armed force abroad without a declaration of war is still involving the Congress. What an administration cannot do without money, it cannot do without the Congress. For a president to give the commands that set fighting in motion, and then come to Congress and ask to appropriate the money needed to pay for the fighting, is simply an effort to exclude Congress from the formulation of the policy in the first place.

It's often succeeded. Congress has indeed been excluded from the policy, and has only paid the cost of putting it into effect, but the price has been very high. The price has been a Congress that quickly comes to reflect public dissatisfactions and disenchantment. It is a Congress that feels no need or obligation to explain and defend a policy it had no hand in making. But if the war continues for long without an end in sight, the angry public dissatisfaction will become evident quickly. On the face of it, at least, the administration office has nothing to gain and much to lose by letting this undeclared war continue indefinitely. If it continues, the Nixon administration stands to inherit the renewed dissension and the political turmoil that forced the Johnson administration to forgo another term. Any plans it may have for domestic programs will be lost in the competition for funds and the welter of political conflict. A return to constitutionalism in foreign policy, and a restriction of the use of military power, is in the interest of both people and government. It should be sought at once by the American people.

The major role of our international relations in recent years has been in Asia. The stabilization of affairs in Europe, in spite of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, has induced the State Department / Defense Department complex that runs our international relations to turn its attention primarily to Asia. It is done so with no clear rationale, and with no showing of where American security interests in Asia actually lie. In fact, events, particularly military events, have dictated policy at critical turning points and have been responsible for our having backed into a full-scale war in Vietnam that no policy maker would have advised or recommended in advance. The formal rationale of our policy in Asia was formulated at the close of World War II.

What we regarded as vital to our interests were certain islands in the Pacific which had served as stepping stones for Japan in her launching of a war against us. We saw it and obtained trusteeships over there. But mainland Asia was put beyond our immediate security needs. The attitude in the United States toward Indochina, for example, was in keeping with our attitude towards the rest of colonial Asia. Burma, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya had been easy pickings for Japan, largely because they were colonies of western powers. Elliot Roosevelt quotes his father as saying of the future of Indochina, en route to Casablanca, quote: "The native Indochinese have been so flagrantly downtrodden that they thought to themselves: anything must be better than to live under French colonial rule."

Cordell Hull quotes FDR as favoring a trusteeship for all of Indochina. During World War II, our ally in Indochina was none other than Ho Chi Min, who was supported and supplied by American intelligence units. He was one of our guerilla leaders in the war against Japan. Roosevelt's death and the surge of the Communist Chinese across the Chinese mainland brought about a radical change in American policy, not only toward Indochina, but toward Asia generally. It is hard to say how much of the change was due to the elements of world politics, and how much as due to the facts of American domestic politics. Certainly, the American people were shocked by the Communist takeover of China. Chiang Kai-shek been a war-time ally. He and his family had been highly romanticized by the American press. Billions worth of American weapons and war materiel had been given to China to keep her in the war against Japan, and thousands of Americans had served in the China theater. Having just finished a war, the United States had no taste for going back to Asia for another. There was no American military intervention on behalf of Chiang. The shock of China's fall to Communism was taken out, instead, in the domestic political arena. Probably few in this audience recall the violence of the charges that flew blaming the Communist takeover not on the Communists, not on the failure of the nationalists, but upon American diplomats. It was the beginning of the Joe McCarthy era. It was the height of the post-war era, when we believed our military and financial power was so supreme in the world that nothing could happen anywhere without having been willed to happen, and probably planned and executed, by American authorities.

By 1950, the democratic administration that had been in office during the fall of China was in headlong retreat. The Secretary of State was daily accused of sympathy and even compliance with Communist objectives in China. He finally found it desirable to become as royal as a king. In February of 1950, the United States recognized the French arrangement of the Bảo Đại government in Indochina, whereby France gave Indochina the form of sovereignty without any of its substance. In May of 1950, the Secretary of State announced that we would furnish arms and money to the French to put down the independence movement led by Ho Chi Min, our former ally. Even so, Secretary of State Acheson drew for the press a line enclosing the string of islands lying off the Asian mainland, and described it as the new perimeter of the American security interest. It embraced Japan, Okinawa, for most of the Philippines, and New Zealand.

That chain, he said, was part of our security: the clear inference being that what lay beyond was not.

It was widely assumed at the time that this press conference description served as an invitation to North Korea to invade the South, on the assumption that because Korea lay outside the Acheson line, the United States would not act. The United States did act, of course, but we did so under our obligations as a signatory to the United Nations charter. Like all signatories, we have obligations under it that exceed our own national security interest, but here again, events began to dictate a change in policy. Once the United States became heavily involved in a war undertaken under the aegis of the United Nations, we began to justify it in terms of our national interests. In a speech a few weeks ago, to the National Press Club, Averell Harriman chided Americans for their bad habit of escalating their objectives in mid-war. He was talking, of course, about Vietnam, but he well could have been talking about Korea.

American apprehensions about Communist China were in control. The United States military and financial aid to France to pursue the Indochina war was stepped up. It would add up to 2.6 billion dollars before France finally gave up. The announcement of increased aid to France in 1950 was combined with an announcement that the seventh fleet would be stationed in the Formosa Strait to protect Chiang Kai-shek. As happened with China, no amount of United States aid could salvage the French cause in Indochina. Even so, there still was no American intervention. President Eisenhower vetoed all such suggestions on the ground that they would be more costly than anticipated, and secondly, because he was not willing to act without the support and participation of other allies.

What we did instead in 1954 was to set out upon a new salvage effort in South Vietnam. We installed Diệm as president, a man who had set out the war in the United States. We financed his government, equipped his army, and encouraged him to ignore the requirements of the Geneva agreement that North and South Vietnam be united under a single government, a course of action that violated every major article of the Geneva accords of ‘54. At almost the same time, China’s bombardment of islands within the artillery range of the mainland induced the administration to seek advanced approval from Congress for military action against China. The Formosa resolution is the direct forebearer of the Tonkin Gulf resolution. The Formosa resolution, in my opinion, cannot be separated from the basic cause of our being involved in South Vietnam. It authorized the President, and I quote, “to employ the armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary, for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack. This authority to include the security and protection of such related positions and territories of that area, now in friendly hands, and the taking of such other measures, as he, the president, judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.”

Quickly, may I say, it was a preventive war resolution. Three of us fought it. Langer of North Dakota, the truest liberal with whom I've ever served in my years in the Senate; Herbert Lehman of New York; and your speaker this afternoon. Three votes against it; but in the Formosa resolution, we laid down a support, again outside the framework of the Constitution, of a preventive war resolution. At issue were not Formosa and the Pescadores at all. They were under assault, and China had no means of bringing them under assault. At issue were two tiny islands of Kumoi and Matsu within three miles of the mainland. That's what the Formosa resolution is all about. Senator George of Georgia presented the resolution to the Senate. He said: "We must commit American military power to the defense of these islands, because their abandonment would dishearten the nationalists on Formosa." He went on to say—and don't forget, he not only was the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, but Chairman of the Joint Committee of Foreign Relations and Armed Serves that conducted the secret hearings on this preventive war resolution—he went on to say, "If Formosa falls into unfriendly hands, it would be with the greatest difficulty that we could defend not merely Japan, nor merely the Philippines, which lie a relatively short distance from Formosa and Okinawa; but the whole of Southeast Asia, clear down to the end of the great countries that lie under the equator, would be in danger." That is clear: one of your first expressions of the famous domino theory. What is clear now from the Formosa resolution is that American security interests were seen all across the mainland of Asia, where they had never been seen before; and an obligation to defend countries was where it had never been seen before.

Senator Smith of New Jersey, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who joined Senator George in the argument in putting the resolution through the Senate, was also explicit in moving the American defense line under the Asian mainland. He said, "Let us first consider a line drawn from Korea down through China, and down through Indochina. We see three danger spots which might well result in the entire Asiatic world being engulfed in Communism. And if that should happen, the security of the United States and the Western free world would be seriously threatened. Unless we maintain and strengthen the defenses in solidarity of our allies; unless the program of the administration under President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles is carried out, so that the defense of those areas is maintained, we shall face one of the most critical periods of our history."

Notice: no talk about multilateral action. No talk about the enforcement of the peacekeeping procedures of the United Nations at the time of the Formosa resolution, as some of us argued for. Unilateral action. And that's why I would have you never set aside the import of the Formosa resolution in the development of Asian foreign policy in the United States, which has already slaughtered more than three hundred thousand American boys. What was not foreseen was that the price and futility of defending those areas would itself cause one of the most critical periods in our history. In Asia, we have worked a domino theory in reverse.

To defend the United States we needed Pacific islands like the Marianas put under our trusteeship; then to protect those islands we needed Japan, Okinawa, Formosa, and the Philippines; then to defend Japan, Okinawa, Formosa, and the Philippines, we needed the islands immediately off the mainland plus Korea, and now, South Vietnam. It seems likely that in Asia, there is still not an end to what more we must contest in order to keep what we have. Whether or not the Vietnam War ends, this trend in our Asian policy will draw us deeper and deeper into war in Asia. Unless we repudiate the Eisenhower, Nixon, Dulles military containment policy *vis-à-vis* China initiated in 1953, we may very well become the greatest threat to peace in the world. We cannot militarily contain China without eventually going to war with China 10, 25, 35, 50 years from now. Such a war will produce an empty victory at best, and a sure loss of our Constitutional system of self-government.

Now is the time to bring the American military under the control and checks of our Constitutional system, based upon government by law rather than by the exercise of arbitrary power by presidents, secretaries of state and defense, joint chiefs of staff, CIAs, Formosa and Tonkin Bay resolutions, and our blood money military-industrial complex. Now is the time for the American people to demand a foreign policy that commits us to a military withdrawal from Asia and elsewhere in the world where we are maintaining a unilateral military posture of dominance! I have made very clear in speech after speech that in my judgement, every American soldier now stationed abroad should be brought home, and that we should join with the United Nations in its peacekeeping procedures and multilateral enforcement of the peace, and stop our unilateral policy! Now is the time. [applause]

Now is the time for us to return to the foreign policy role offering to abide by the binding jurisdiction of adjudication through multilateral negotiations of threats to the peace of the world, conducted under the aegis of international tribunals and treaties, such as that of the United Nations. Yes, now is the time for us to practice our professed ideals of believing in the substitution of the rules of law of the United Nations treaty for the jungle law of the military claw, as we have come to practice it in Vietnam, and threaten to practice it elsewhere in Asia. Unless the killing of American troops in Southeast Asia is stopped quickly, domestic disunity is certain to increase, because a foreign policy that conscripts youth into military fodder to be consumed in an immoral and unjustifiable war, will eventually be repudiated by the American people. It is being repudiated by tens upon tens of thousands of our citizens, and it should be. President Nixon's announcement to leave our troops in Vietnam for an indefinite period, resulting in thousands more being slaughtered and wounded, in further escalation of the war. His attempt to justify a scientifically unsound ABM monstrosity by playing upon the fears of our people. [applause]

His military approach to foreign policy in general bode ill for his administration, and may be a catastrophe for the nation. It would appear that on the basis of what we have seen thus far from the new administration, in respect to its role in foreign policy and the military

commitments we can expect from it, the only thing that will stop the military from marching our youth into a greater war is for our citizens to start marching across this republic for peace. Thank you very much.

[applause, 45 seconds]

CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Morse. The person who, at one time in his career, was attached with the title of the one-man filibuster: you can see the reason why. [laughter] Plenty to react with there. Recently, Washington columnist Jack Wilson pointed out in the press that the Senate was considering the adding of sound equipment to their chambers, and his comment at that time, and I think a very worthy one, was that already they are beginning to miss Wayne Morse.

Now, it's not possible for us to take these microphones here down to you, but the Senator has conceded to answer questions from the floor. If you'll stand, make yourself known, so that we might hear and interpret the question for everybody's edification, the Senator will react to any questions you might have. Please.

[question asked in background, off microphone and inaudible]

Was everyone able to hear that question? The Senator asked that I repeat the thing, and I'm not exactly sure I can go through it all the way. You were asking about the change of heart with regards to President Thieu, and the willingness to negotiate with the North Vietnamese and what this bodes for not only the Vietnamese, but foreign relations generally?

[inaudible reply]

In other words, are we pulling strings with regard to the policy making decisions from the South Vietnamese, even already?

[inaudible reply]

Yes. With regard to President Thieu's willingness now to negotiate with the North Vietnamese, and was this his decision, in your opinion, or was this decision imposed upon him by the Nixon administration?

SENATOR MORSE: Well, I am not that sufficiently privy with the administration to know its motivations… [laughter] but I'll make this comment on what I think is the background of the question. I don't think you can have any peace negotiations at Paris, and I don't think you are having any. I think you're having discussions among combatants trying to work out some terms for, at best, a truce. That isn't going to give you any peace. As you know, I have opposed from

the beginning the set-up of the table at Paris, not because of the physical nature of the table, but because of who's participating around it. You're not going to get a peace settlement involving Asia unless you have a multilateral table. Unless you have a table with the United States and our allies on one side, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong on the other side, but at the head of the table, calling the shots so to speak, making the proposals for fair and equitable settlements, and negotiating a settlement around such proposals, you're going to have to have representatives of the non-combative nations of the world acting under the aegis of international tribunals. Whether it's the Security Council, or the National Assembly, or whether it's the Geneva Conference expanded, or representatives of all three of the groups I've just mentioned. What we gotta face up to is, you have left that era of history in which combatants will ever again make a peace. They will only agree on the terms for cessation of hostilities. Anything that's agreed upon in Paris is going to have to be acceptable to Asia, and you're going to have to have the approval, in the long run, of Cambodia, of Burma, of Laos, of Japan, of India, of China. They're going to determine what the military postures of potential and past combatants are going to be in Asia, and that's what we've never been willing to face up to. And that's why we should have, from the very beginning, not been acting unilaterally over there at all, but been acting through a multilateral format, such as I have described. [applause]

CHAIRMAN: I have a question up here. Please stand and...

[question in background, inaudible]

The question deals with the Senate vote on the ABM issue, which is to come before it soon, and the question asks the Senator's opinion as to whether the opinions of people such nature as Senators Fulbright and Gore will have much of an effect. Is that a fair representation?

[inaudible reply]

Oh, and whether you feel the bill will pass.

SENATOR MORSE: Well, I'll show you what's happened since 1967. In 1967, six of us in the Senate voted against the ABM as proposed then. There's been quite a shift, as you can see, in sentiment since. Incidentally, I think that the hearings that Senator Fulbright and Senator Gore have been conducting about ABM have been very educational and if they will continue them, and I pray that they will, they may very well produce the turn of the tide. For I happen to think that the hearings that Senator Fulbright conducted in regards to Vietnam explain, in no small measure, that a great contribution was made to public enlightenment in regard to what was involved in the war in Vietnam. And I think it escalated here at home the peace movement. And I'm hoping that those hearings will have a similar effect on the ABM. The ABM would be defeated in the Senate only if the American people want it defeated and make their views

clearly known in the next 60 days, because I think the major votes probably will come towards the end of a 60-day period.

Why did I vote against it in ’67? I was one of six, and why would I vote against it now? Because in 1967, the scientific testimony, the science before it, just overwhelmingly against the scientific feasibility of the plan and I am of the opinion that’s true today. In addition, you have the other arguments against it. Not only this matter of cost and the danger of our impeding the cause of disarmament, because there’s no hope for peace as long as nations continue to arm. We got to learn that lesson. We got to learn again that you are going to have to have peace enforced, as I said, multilaterally and not unilaterally. I think the effect of this proposal, this appeal to fear, of both Laird and the President as a basis of trying to scare us into the expenditure of this fund, that’ll come to be understood by the American people as the old, old trick that they always propose when they want to escalate the military combine in this country. And it’s up to you, the American people, if you want to be subjected to this kind of a waste of their money and a weakening of their security. Then they’re going to have to pay the historical costs.

On the other hand, I think what the President is doing, and what Laird is doing, is deepening the chasms of disunity within the republic. This program will never unite the American people, and if you continue to escalate this war, then a future administration of this government will get the same message from the American people that the French people gave Mendès France. When Dulles went to Paris and tried to persuade Mendès France to stay in the Indochina war, the answer came from the French people. They said to Mendès France that you either get those troops out or we’ll have a new government. If we continue to slaughter these American boys in an immoral and unjustifiable war, as unpopular as the suggestion is, I’m convinced it will come. The American people will be so split that no government can survive those in opposition to the war, and you’ll have not only a new administration, but you’ll have a great change, may I say, in the exercise of power that presidents of the United States have come to exercise. [applause]

CHAIRMAN: A couple questions way in the back, I saw one hand, please.

[question asked in background]

You’re curious in having the Senator answer questions about future Vietnams that might be developing in the Caribbean regions of Central and South America? Bolívia, Columbia, and other Latin and South American nations.

SENATOR MORSE: Well, you know I served for years as Chairman of the Latin American sub-committee, and my committee at first was divided, and it became almost unanimous in opposition to military aid into Latin American countries. An overwhelming majority of us were opposed, for example, to the recognition of military juntas, because military juntas keep down freedom, they do not strengthen freedom. The stream of the Alliance for Progress program has

been polluted by American military aid into Latin America. It wasn't envisioned by Jack Kennedy at all. The program came out of my subcommittee when Kennedy was a member of it. We didn't have a word of military aid into Latin America under the Alliance for Progress program. It carried out the proposal of Roosevelt, expressed in Tehran, in regard to a trusteeship for all of Indochina to be participated in by all the Western powers and all the Asian powers, including China. And what was it? Set up a trusteeship of exporting economic freedom of choice to the inhabitants of those underdeveloped areas, and literacy. For Roosevelt recognized the two greatest weapons you have against any form of totalitarianism, you name it: Communism, or juntas, or dictatorships of any kind, is to develop an economically free, enlightened people and then give them time; and they'll develop their own system of political self-determination. Now that's what we envision in the Alliance for Progress program.

Now this tendency on the part of our government to come to the support of military juntas in Latin America will at least be productive, in my judgement, over the years of revolution in Latin America. And then the question is, is the United States going to come to the aid of any totalitarian governments that seek to resist those revolutions? I do not see in the immediate future very much of a danger of more South Vietnams, that is, our military participation manpower-wise, in Latin America. I think that the administrations have learned that you can't sell this so close to our own shores.

[audio skips and picks up again mid-sentence]

SENATOR MORSE: […] of which I got very, very few votes was my amendment to create a new group of conscientious objectors on the basis of a question of a matter of conscience, of not being willing to fight in an undeclared war, and not being willing to fight in a war that they considered to be immoral and unjustifiable. It's just as easy, in my judgement, for a reviewing board to determine whether you are dealing with a sincere conscientious objector on those criteria, or whether you're dealing with a phony or draft dodger. The argument against me was that my amendment was highly subjective, while the conscientious objection provision of the existing law on religious grounds is just as subjective. And I think that my point of view has best been expressed, and much more eloquently expressed and cogently expressed than I expressed it, by the recent decision out of Boston by Judge Wyzanski. I don't know whether it will survive the legal test, but I'm glad that we have a decision now that's going to go up for at least a review of whether or not it is sound in its legal implications, and that may augment the interest in the Senate and the House to pass an amendment, in case the decision should be reversed.

CHAIRMAN: Before we get to the next question, I see people leaving for classes and other purposes, and before much more of the captive part of the audience leaves, I want to be sure and announce that something very similar to what is taking place today, another very high-level presentation, is in store for anybody who is free and cares to come at 2 p.m., when the

honorable Covey Oliver, our man in Anguilla, will be here to speak about the international situation as he sees it. Now, John had a question.

[audio skips]

Louder.

[question asked off microphone, unintelligible]

The question deals with the *Time* and *Life* magazines; *Newsweek*? Yes.

[inaudible reply; applause]

We'll see if I can preface the question the way you did, John. There was a review recently of *Time* and *Newsweek* magazines regarding the spring of '61 and the saving of the Asian situation by establishing a "Bamboo Curtain" around China. And in the intervening 8 or 9 or 10 years, we've seemed to have learned nothing in the process, and the question, which I'm not sure anyone is capable of answering is, why in the name of all that's holy have we failed to learn? And how can we teach?

SENATOR MORSE: Well, you're doing a pretty good job in your symposium, if you're having them all over the country. This is putting democracy to work. You have people that gather together to use their cortexes rather than their adrenaline glands to reach conclusions in regard to policy. There's no substitute for public education. All I simply want to say is a great deal has been learned since 1961. In fact, Kennedy came to change his position a great deal from what it was in 1961. Time doesn't permit me to give you at least my views as to the steps that took place, both on the part of Jack Kennedy and Bob Kennedy, that changed their position regard to Asia. I'm satisfied that at the time of his death, Jack Kennedy was on his way to formulating a program for getting out of Southeast Asia. I think he had learned his lesson by that time, but you're never going to be able to prove it. You're talking about a dead man; you don't know what he would have said or done, but on the basis of such discussions I had with him, I was satisfied that he was going to have some drastic modifications of his Vietnam policy. And had he lived, I don't think there ever would have been the type of escalation that Lyndon Johnson led us into.

But the last thing I want to say about your question is, don't be of faint heart. Don't be discouraged about being able to get the American people to learn. The trouble is, we don't give them the facts; and I have many things I could cite. I think I'll just make this comment about one of the great things that's a hold out on the American people, and that's secret diplomacy in American foreign policy. Secret diplomacy has no place in a free society. You, the people, are entitled to know the facts about your foreign policy, and all this talk and many before him have

said the same thing, but now this line of Nixon. Got to keep us in the dark, we're gonna do all this in secrecy.

Remember this tenet of Constitutional law I now leave you with: the advice and consent clause of the Constitution is not language that provides for action after the fact. The advice and consent clause of the Constitution is a clause that calls for advice and consent in the *formulation* of policy, not in the approval of policy already formulated. One of my greatest teachers on foriegn policy in my years in the Senate was a great Republican, Arthur Vandenburg of Michigan, who worked out with Franklin Roosevelt the famous bipartisan foriegn policy of Roosevelt, based on the view and dramatic expression that foreign policy stops at the water's edge, as far as partisanship is concerned. Well, Vandenburg made very clear that he would exclude partisanship, provided the advice and consent clause was properly implemented; and what was his explanation of how it should be implemented? He used a figure of speech; he was quoted at the time saying to President Roosevelt, "I'm not going to join you on a foriegn policy flight unless you tell me in advance where we're going, the condition of the plane, and something about the weather. For I don't want to be just included in the crash landings." And that's a pretty good way of putting it. [applause]

I want to say, to the everlasting credit of President Johnson, that although he didn't do it enough, he did it much much more than has been done in many past administrations in at least seeking advice in advance of reaching any decision concerning foreign policy. There are many examples I could give you; very quickly, I'll tell you one: two and a half, three years ago, when as chairman of the Latin American subcommittee I was advised of some disturbing rumors that we had negotiators that were negotiating some amendments to the organization of American states charter, and if the rumors were correct, it was perfectly obvious that my committee would probably be unanimously opposed to any such amendments coming up for conformation. So I called Secretary Rusk, and I said, I don't know if there's anything to it or not, Mr. Secretary, but my committee has unanimously directed me to call you and advise you that we would like to have you send up the negotiators to brief us as to what they really are proposing and what they are proposing to agree to in these conferences. And Secretary Rusk agreed to do that. And we had three conferences with those negotiators. The information that we had received was completely correct! They were going along with the demands of some of the Latin American negotiators to proposals we couldn't possibly become parties to. As a result of that, they got our advice in advance. I invited all the members of the full committee to attend meetings of my subcommittee, and many of them came, including Bill Fulbright, who sat through each one of them. There isn't any doubt that that application of the advice and consent clause produced an entirely different set of amendments, because they went back to their negotiations in Latin America and said, we haven't a chance in getting these matters ratified by the Senate.

Now, I'm not standing before you and telling you that under no circumstances whatsoever should we not keep secrets for the time being from the American people, but we shouldn't keep them from their representatives under this check and balance system. And that's why I'm unalterably opposed, for example, to the power we have given to the CIA. It is a police state institution within a democracy! [applause]

And to pick a handful of senators and congressmen and take them in on the know with their lips sealed! For example, I can't go to Dick Russell—or, when I was in the Senate, I couldn't go to Dick Russell and ask him to tell me anything that took place in the briefings that the CIA had given him, because his lips were sealed! And so that's not following the advice and consent clause at all! That's why you have found me supporting the Mansfield resolution first, and then the Gene McCarthy resolution, that seeks to bring the CIA under the same legislative surveillance of legislative committees of the Congress that every other activity of the government is supposed to be subjected to.

And even then, you're not able to get out of the state department or the defense department the facts that you need. And because of the label "top secret," and under that label and the doctrine of executive privilege, they can refuse to give you information, and I want to tell you that that is tyrannical danger. It's a very dangerous policy, and I urge you to give it more thought than you may have given to date in regard to placing restrictions on so-called secret diplomacy and executive secrecy, because putting the label "top secret" on a document doesn't mean that it contains a word in it that really should be kept secret, at least in the first place from the representatives of the people, and second from the people themselves. [applause]

CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Morse! We appreciate your coming very much, and I think that if there are others of you that would like to meet him, talk with him afterwards; please catch him by the door, but at this time, this session is now adjourned.

[program ends]